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Abstract   This paper examines the impact of the introduction of Individual
Transferable Quotas (ITQs) on catch, market share, and capacity utilization of
firms in the Mid Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog (SCOQ) Fishery. Via the
production function framework, catch and market share regression models are
utilized in examining the effects of operator size, vessel age, and alternative
product catch variables on industrial structure and how such effects changed af-
ter ITQs were introduced. Results indicate that in both fisheries, the ITQ system
enhanced the value of each vessel by allowing vessel owners to apply greater ef-
fort to fewer boats, thus reducing excess capacity in the fishery. Results also
indicate an overall resource conservation effect of ITQ introduction in the surf
clam fishery. These results suggest that in the presence of ITQs, overall effi-
ciency was enhanced in the SCOQ fishery.
Key words   Fisheries, individual transferable quotas, industrial organization,
market share, ocean quahog, surf clam.
Introduction
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) constitute a form of rights-based allocation in
natural resource management (Neher, Arnason, and Mollet 1989). Under an ITQ sys-
tem, shares of a quota are allocated among individuals or firms which are free to
trade them. The objective is to allow the market mechanism to influence decisions
about the allocation of labor, capital, and other resources, in contrast to the incen-
tives for overcapacity created by open-access or competitive-quota resource man-
agement systems (Anderson 1986, 1989; Squires, Kirkley, and Tisdell 1995; Young
and McCay 1995).
Under an ITQ system, an annual quota or the total allowable catch (TAC) is bro-
ken into shares which, in the Mid Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog (SCOQ)
fishery, were initially distributed to all vessel owners with permits for the fishery.
The amount of the share was based on performance history and investment in the
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fishery. It is important to note that the shareholders do not own rights to the clams
themselves, but they do own a share or percentage of the TAC. The TAC is determined
by the Mid Atlantic Fisheries Management Council (MAFMC) upon advice from scien-
tists and industry representatives, taking into account biological and other variables.
The quota was similarly determined before the ITQ system was introduced.
An ITQ owner may sell or lease his or her quota share. Hence, high-cost vessel
owners holding quota shares are likely to sell or lease out their quota shares, while
low-cost owners will buy or lease shares from others. Consequently, ITQs can re-
duce over-capitalization by providing incentives for greater efficiency on the part of
all operators, which for some may mean selling out and for others may mean buying
in. Thus, ITQs are expected to aid the retention of and enhance fishing by the most
efficient operators, result in fewer vessel owners, and lead to greater incomes for re-
maining vessel owners.
The first comprehensive ITQ system in marine fisheries was enacted in New
Zealand in 1986 (Sissenwine and Mace 1992). Others have followed in Australia,
Canada, Iceland, and other countries. The subject of this article is the first ITQ sys-
tem for U.S. marine fisheries: the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) fishery for
Mid Atlantic surf clams and ocean quahogs. Both surf clams (Spisula solidissima)
and ocean quahogs (Arctica islandica) are species of clams processed into consumer
food products. The ITQ system was implemented in October 1990. Since the intro-
duction of ITQs, the SCOQ fishery has been of great interest to fisheries economists
and managers.
Appraisals of the Mid Atlantic SCOQ fishery have shown that since the intro-
duction of ITQs, economic efficiency in clam harvesting has increased, excess har-
vesting capacity has declined (Wang 1995), employment has declined, and thus the
bargaining power of crew and captains has declined (McCay, Gatewood, and Creed
1990; McCay and Creed 1994; McCay 1994). However, specific empirical, econo-
metric evidence of the role of ITQs in these and other changes is lacking. Specifi-
cally, evidence is lacking about the impact of ITQs on individual catch and market
share, on the concentration of operators, on capitalization in the industry and on re-
source conservation. Uncovering such important evidence is the focus of this paper.
Individual Transferable Quotas are controversial largely because of concerns
about the social consequences of bringing market forces to bear upon rights to par-
ticipate in a fishery where such rights have either been free (as in open access) or
determined by governmental processes (McCay 1994). For example, some long-time
operators exit the fishery as the benefits of selling their quota share become greater
than the benefits of using the quota share to harvest clams. There is related concern
that the ITQ system can disadvantage small-scale fishermen and the coastal commu-
nities dependent on them (Moore 1993; Gifford 1997). Because of these and other
possible social consequences, it is important to accurately document the structural
impacts, benefits, and adverse consequences associated with ITQ introduction. Spe-
cific empirical evidence showing causality between ITQs and various industrial or-
ganizational changes that have occurred in the fishery will be helpful in understand-
ing the advantages as well as the disadvantages of ITQs.
In this paper we address these questions by looking at how regulatory changes
may have affected the structure of the industry, the absolute and relative level of
production of firms, and resource conservation in the industry. In other articles, we
examine changing structures of ownership and the extent of market power (Adelaja,
Menzo, and McCay 1998). The specific goal of this paper is to isolate the effects of
the ITQ system by estimating the extent to which it has led to increases in a vessel
owner’s production (catch) as well as share of surf clam/ocean quahog landings, and
the mechanism by which these changes have happened. Also examined is its net im-
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source conservation. The analysis is based on simple linear production function re-
gressions which allow estimation of the magnitudes of the impacts of factors of pro-
duction on operator catch (landings) and shares of total landings. Among the ex-
planatory factors are indicators of fixed inputs or the nature of the physical plant
(e.g., fleet size, vessel size, vessel age, and alternative product catch), industry out-
put regulation (i.e., total allowable catch) and ITQ related variables to capture the
independent effects of ITQ introduction. Given the importance of determining if
ITQs have worked to offer greater advantages to vessel owners of certain fleets (cer-
tain size, age, and product mix), cross-terms between ITQs (a dummy variable for
the presence of ITQs) and other explanatory variables were included in the regres-
sion. As it will be shown later, by comparing the impacts of ITQ introduction on
operator’s catch and share, effects on total industry catch is further determined. This
has implications for the resource conservation effects of ITQs.
The background section provides a brief history of the Mid Atlantic SCOQ fish-
ery. The conceptual framework section conceptualizes the effects of ITQs on an
owner’s catch and share of landed clams via a production function framework. The
empirical model, data and estimation section presents the modeling techniques. The
empirical results and conclusion, respectively, provide the results of the regressions
and a summary and conclusion.
Background of the Mid Atlantic SCOQ Fishery
Vessel owners in the SCOQ fishery may use their boats and crews to harvest both
surf clams and ocean quahogs. Surf clams are found both close to shore and at
greater depths, whereas ocean quahogs are found only well beyond the surf. Until
the early 1970s, surf clams were harvested mainly off the coasts of New York and
New Jersey. As stocks declined, vessel owners moved their operations further south
to the North Carolina and Virginia coasts. In 1976, the surf clam stock collapsed due
to over-harvesting and to anoxic conditions. This collapse led fishermen to look for
alternative sources of income and for alternative uses for their vessels. A substitute
resource for the surf clam was found in the ocean quahog (Lipton and Strand 1992).
Although ocean quahogs had been harvested commercially since the mid 1940s in
the Rhode Island and Block Island Sound fisheries, it was not until the 1976 col-
lapse of the surf clam stock that ocean quahog production began to develop in the
Mid Atlantic region (Kennish and Lutz 1995).
The Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Act was passed in 1976, during the
same period the surf clam resource was in serious trouble. The Magnuson Act ex-
tended national jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 nautical miles (the Exclusive Economic
Zone or EEZ) and created a system for managing both foreign and domestic fisheries.
Eight regional councils were established across the U.S. for this purpose. The Mid At-
lantic Fisheries Management Council (MAFMC) quickly took up the challenge of
managing the EEZ surf clam and ocean quahog fishery. In 1977 the first fishery
management plan was approved for the SCOQ fishery. Between 1979 and 1988, the
SCOQ fishery management plan was amended seven times. In 1988, Amendment #8
was passed to create the ITQ system; the amendment went into effect in 1990.
Until the implementation of the ITQ system, the surf clam fishery and the ocean
quahog fishery were managed differently. Between 1979 and 1988, the surf clam
fishery was managed using various combinations of regulations including quarterly
and annual quotas, time limits set on hours that a vessel could fish, a moratorium on
entry of new vessels, minimum clam size requirements, the use of catch logbooks,
and vessel permits. After ten years of this type of regulation, the fishery was very
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from 1970 through 1990. Under the rules of the moratorium, participation required
ownership of one of the original vessels (vessels that were active in the fishery be-
fore the moratorium was implemented), but catch rates increased while the overall
total allowable catch (TAC) did not fluctuate to a great degree. Although the TAC and
the number of vessels did not change much, new technologies were added to vessels
which gave them greater harvesting capacity. Overcapacity resulted to the point that by
1985 a surf clam vessel was allowed to fish for only six hours every other week. In
addition, the task of dealing with several regulations under the effort limitation
scheme proved unreasonably time consuming and complicated for administrators.
The ocean quahog fishery was not regulated nearly to the degree that the surf
clam fishery was. Although the fishery management plan called for regulation of
both surf clams and ocean quahogs, many provisions directed toward ocean quahogs
were never put in place (Brandt 1994–95). No entry or effort restrictions were imposed
between 1979 and 1988, with the exception of an annual landings quota. Finally, it
was agreed to simplify the SCOQ fishery management plan by implementing ITQs.
On 1 October 1990, the ITQ system was implemented (McCay and Creed 1994).
Table 1
History of the Mid Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery, 1970–90
Date Event
1970–72 Sharp increase in VA Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surf clam (SC) landings
and decline in NJ EEZ SC landings.
1974 VA EEZ SC landings exceed NJ EEZ SC landings.
1975–76 Collapse of NJ SC fishery, due to low levels of oxygen in the spring and summer.
1976–79 Continued drop in landings.
1976 First MAFMC meeting.
1977 First Fishery Management Plan (FMP) approved for SCOQ fishery. Quarterly
quota for SCs, annual quota for ocean quahogs (OQs). Effort limitation,
permit, logbook provisions, and vessel moratorium included for SC fishery, OQ
fishery is open access.
1978 Amendment #1 implemented. Extends SCOQ FMP through December 1979.
Moratorium in SC fishery is continued.
1980 Amendment #2 implemented. Extends SCOQ FMP through December 1981. SC
fishery is divided into New England and Mid Atlantic area. The moratorium is
continued in the Mid Atlantic region. Beginning of recovery in SC landings.
1981 Amendment #3 approved November 1981. The FMP is extended indefinitely. The
moratorium is extended in the Mid Atlantic region.
1984 Amendment #4 implemented on emergency basis. Never approved, but later
incorporated into Amendment #6.
1984 Amendment #5 implemented. Revised the SC minimum size limit provisions and
extended the size limit through the entire fishery. Instituted a cage tag provision.
1986 Amendment #6 implemented. Implemented provisions of proposed Amendment
#4. Quota adjustments made. Weekly landing limits for the Nantucket Shoals
Area are eliminated. Presented additional justification for the one landing per
trip provision.
1987 Amendment #7 approved. The amendment was developed to change the quota
distribution on the Georges Bank.
1990 Amendment #8 approved by NOAA. Institution of Individual Transferable Quota
system.
Source: Amendment #8 Fishery Management Plan for the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fish-
ery. Mid Atlantic Fishery Management Council in cooperation with the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
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Although several observable changes have taken place since the introduction of
the ITQ system to this fishery, it is not known to what extent the ITQ system has
influenced some of these changes. The first change to be noted is that of a shift
northward in the landings of surf clams. Just as the industry shifted south in the
1970s, the Mid Atlantic states, especially New Jersey, have shown increasingly
larger shares of catch during the 1988–94 period. In 1988, New Jersey operators
landed 57% of all landed surf clams, while Virginia operators landed 20%. By 1994,
New Jersey operators harvested 86% of landed surf clams while Virginia operators
landed none. This shift northward developed as catch per unit effort began to decline
in more southern states.
The second set of changes suggests that overcapacity declined. Our review of
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) data, combined with the data set we de-
veloped for a study of ownership,1 shows that the number of active vessels in the
fishery declined markedly between 1988–94 (the decision to create an ITQ regime
was made in 1990). In 1988 there were 133 boats fishing for surf clams in the EEZ;
by 1994, there were only 48. This is not surprising, given the fact that the original
moratorium created an artificial incentive to own more vessels than needed to har-
vest the surf clams;2 ITQs enabled rapid adjustment of capacity. In the 1988 ocean
quahog fishery, 62 vessels participated, but only 35 vessels were active in 1994. Al-
most as dramatic was the decline in the number of firms that owned active surf clam
vessels, from 56 in 1988 to 28 in 1994. In the ocean quahog fishery, the number of
participating firms declined from 24 in 1988 to 17 in 1994. This result is also re-
markable, suggesting the high degree of consolidation of ownership predicted by
many opponents of ITQs.
Other changes included a steady increase in hours fishing per vessel (table 2)
and in the average surf clam catch per trip (figure 1). Average surf clam trips per
vessel (figure 2) and average surf clam catch per vessel rose as well over the period.
This would ordinarily reflect the greater utilization of vessels that results from the
displacement of less productive vessels under an ITQ system. Changes in these mea-
sures in the ocean quahog fishery are slightly more ambiguous (figures 3 and 4 and
table 2), although it is clear that the number of trips taken per vessel rose between
1988 and 1994. While these changes suggest that capacity has been more fully uti-
lized and vessels less often idled (the intended effect of the ITQ), empirical evi-
dence is lacking in the economic literature to support such a hypothesis. Other more
salient changes may also have occurred, such as an independent effect of ITQ intro-
duction on actual industry catch. The investigation conducted in this study will pro-
vide some explanation for these changes.
Conceptual Framework
Perhaps the appropriate starting point for evaluating the impact of ITQs on produc-
tion is to conceptualize the effect on fisheries production structure. The catch of an
operator (Ci) is synonymous with the physical quantity of output or production.
1 Our data on ownership of vessels is based on the “true owner” data set created by C.F. Creed (McCay
and Creed 1994), updated with the help of representatives of the fishing industry. NMFS files are inad-
equate to the task of identifying changes in ownership patterns because many firms create separate cor-
porations for each of their vessels. The “true owner” is based on industry recognition of ownership of
vessels, verified where possible through the NMFS license data.
2 Although initial quota share allocation was based on historical participation in the fishery, and there-
fore may also have created an artificial incentive to own vessels, the number of vessels participating was
artificially high even prior to the advent of the ITQ system.Adelaja, McCay, and Menzo 120
Hence, one can specify and estimate a production function for surf clams or ocean
quahogs. Denote the catch of the ith operator of the rth product (surf clam or ocean
quahog) as Ci
rwhere i = 1, 2, …, n; r = s or q (surf clam or ocean quahog); and n is
the total number of operators in the fishery. The production function for the rth




r = (X, ITQ, TAC, Z) (1)
where X = Xv = X1, X2, …, Xw is a vector of conventional inputs or factors of produc-
tion, ITQ is a binary choice variable specified to capture the introduction of ITQ
Figure 1.  Surf Clam Catch per Trip (in bushels), 1988–94
Table 2
Fishing Hours Per Vessel in the
Mid Atlantic SCOQ Fishery, 1988–94
Hours Fishing Per Vessel
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Figure 2.  Surf Clam Trips per Vessel, 1988–94
Figure 3.  Ocean Quahog Catch per Trip (in bushels), 1988–94Adelaja, McCay, and Menzo 122
(ITQ = 1 from 1991–94 and ITQ = 0 otherwise); TAC is Total Allowable Catch
which is a measure of industry output regulation; and Z = Zk = Z1, Z2, …, Zy is a
vector of other exogenous variables. Relevant factors of production to include in the
X vector include measures of the size of the physical plant (e.g., fleet size and vessel
size), measures of the size of variable inputs (e.g., crew size and fuel use), and mea-
sures of constraints on production (e.g., vessel appropriateness and vessel age). A
factor in the production of a product will be the level of output of the alternative
product. Hence, the variables to be included in the Z vector would include ocean
quahog catch in the case of surf clam production and surf clam catch in the case of
ocean quahog production. The production function in equation (1) satisfies the usual
neoclassical properties such that Cix
r  > 0 and Cixx
r  < 0.
Totally differentiating equation (1), one obtains the following:
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where  F v
s and  F v
q are the marginal products of the vth conventional input in the pro-
duction of surf clams and ocean quahogs, respectively;  FITQ
s  and  FITQ
q  are the mar-
ginal impact of ITQ introduction (shift in catch as a result of ITQ introduction),
F TAC
s  and  F TAC
q  are the marginal impacts of TAC adjustment on catch, and  F k
s and  F k
q
are measures of the effects of other exogenous variables. Note that the inclusion of
TAC as an independent variable allows one to isolate the impact of ITQ introduction
on catch through the use of the ITQ dummy.
Figure 4.  Ocean Quahog Trips per Vessel, 1988–94ITQs: Market Share, Efficiency, and Conservation 123
Therefore,
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From equations (4) and (5) it is seen that
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The effect of the introduction of ITQs on the fishery depends on FITQ
s  and  FITQ
q  which
reflect the marginal effect (product) of ITQ introduction. If ITQs are output restrictive,
then  FITQ
s  and  FITQ
q  < 0. As mentioned above, the framework utilized in this paper is the
production function approach. The empirical implementation of the framework would
require the regression of catch against levels of conventional and nonconventional
inputs, including factors such as ITQ introduction and total allowable catch.
Adelaja (1991) has shown the relationship between production (catch) and pro-
ducer share of total industry output. This framework, which involves decomposing
effects of exogenous variables on firm-level catch into effects on yield per unit of
fixed input and fixed input endowment per operator, allows the evaluation of the
structure of production and of industrial organization. It can thus be used to link the
effects of explanatory factors on operator catch to effects on operator’s share of total
industry output. This framework can be used to explain the effects of ITQ introduc-
tion on catch as well as industry structure.
To illustrate the approach, consider the following decomposition of an
operator’s catch during a given period. Denote the total number of vessels owned by
the ith owner by Vi, and the total number of trips made by the operator as Ti. The
following identity holds true:











r = () () ( ) . (8)
Where  CT i
r
i
r is catch per trip which is an effort variable denoting how much catch
is realized on the average trip. Henceforth, this variable will be denoted by the vari-
able  Ei
r (“effort” per trip) since it reflects, to some degree, the extent to which re-
sources are applied on each trip. TV i
r
i
r  is the frequency of trips variable which will
be denoted by the variable  F i
r. Therefore, equation (8) can be re-specified as:Adelaja, McCay, and Menzo 124







r = () () () . (9)
An owner’s share of total fishery catch (Si












= ∑ 1  or total industry catch and n is the number of vessel owners.
CT
r, which is the choice level of total industry catch, is not necessarily equal to TAC
which is the regulated maximum catch. In fact, under an ITQ system, it is conceivable
that profit maximizing CT
r falls below TAC. From equation (9), it is apparent that:








Equation (11) suggests that because the impact of ITQ introduction on catch is the
sum of the impacts on effort, frequency of trips and total vessels, the production
function estimates of impacts of ITQs can be evaluated in the context of effort, fre-
quency, and number of vessels. By combining equations (9) and (10), Si becomes:













r == () () () . (12)
Therefore,














Equation (13) shows that the impact of ITQ introduction on owner’s share of land-
ings can also be decomposed into the impacts on effort, frequency of trips, vessels,
and overall fisheries catch. It is useful in understanding how ITQ introduction af-
fects catch and market share. It is noteworthy that the inclusion of TAC as a causal
factor improves the ability of the ITQ dummy variable to isolate the effect of ITQ on
total actual industry catch.
Now, consider the case where δδ ln C ITQ T
r  = 0. Equation (13) reduces to:










Under this scenario, the impact of ITQ, or indeed any other explanatory factor, on
market share is exactly equal to the impact on firm-level catch. This would be the
case if CT
r is always equal to TAC or when ITQ introduction does not affect CT
r.
Consider an alternative case where δδ ln C ITQ T
r  is not equal to 0. This implies
that






From equation (15), the effect of ITQ introduction on total actual industry catch
(CT
r) is the difference between the impacts on individual firm catch and share. Hence,
to the extent that CT
r differs from TAC, the effects of ITQ on CT
r can be isolated. This
effect is essentially the independent resource conservation effect of ITQ introduc-
tion. That is, the resource conservation effects of ITQ introduction can be observed
by estimating catch as well as share functions and comparing the estimates.ITQs: Market Share, Efficiency, and Conservation 125
The analysis above basically demonstrates that the production function frame-
work can be used to estimate the impact of ITQs on catch, share, and resource con-
servation while simultaneously observing the effects through effort, frequency, and
vessels.
Empirical Model, Data, and Estimation
To operationalize the production function model, simple linear production functions
with selected cross-terms were specified for surf clams and ocean quahogs. The de-
pendent variables are the natural logarithms of owner’s catch (LNCATCH) for each
product. Given the interest in the share equations, another set of dependent variables
is the logarithms of vessel owner’s share (LNSHARE). Independent variables should
include proxies for factors of production (inputs) as well as nonconventional input
variables capturing the effects of policy, production restrictions, and market con-
straints. For this study nonconventional variables include changes in TAC, a dummy
variable depicting ITQ introduction, and variables depicting the catch of the alterna-
tive resource.
Data on variable inputs are limited, and the database did not include information
on production costs. On the other hand, data were abundant on the level of fixed in-
puts, and there was a large choice of fixed inputs to choose from. The fixed factors
upon which data were available included horsepower, dredge size, fleet size, year
built (age), and gross tonnage. The variable factors upon which information was
available included crew size.3 Due to the large number of fixed factors and the possi-
bility of multi-collinearity, correlation analysis was conducted to determine which
ones were correlated. The use of correlated independent variables could lead to
multicollinearity and inefficient parameter estimates.
The correlation coefficients between crew size and most fixed factors were high.
For example, the correlation coefficient between horsepower and crew size was
(0.61), and it was statistically significant at the 5% level. The high correlation be-
tween crew size and other variables, and the fact that crew size is essentially used in
fixed proportions with horsepower suggested a high probability of multicollinearity
if this variable was included in the production function. Most other fixed factors
were highly correlated. A low and statistically insignificant (at the 5% level) correla-
tion coefficient was found between horsepower and year built (0.07), between fleet
size and year built (–0.01), and between fleet size and horsepower (–0.06). Based on
the correlation coefficients, the primary fixed factors of production included as ex-
ogenous variables in the catch and share functions were horsepower, fleet size, and
year built. In addition to these and the ITQ dummy variable, TAC, bushels of the al-
ternate clam resource harvested, and cross-terms between the ITQ variable and other
factors were included. The appropriate estimation technique is a simultaneous equa-
tion estimation method. Hence, the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation
technique was used to estimate the set of catch equations and the set of share equa-
tions, with each set estimated. Preliminary regressions involving all possible exog-
enous variables and all possible cross-terms yielded many insignificant parameter
estimates and exhibited significant multicollinearity. Chow F-tests were used to
identify the appropriate structures of the models. The tests suggested not only that
horsepower, year built, and fleet size were the appropriate fixed factors of produc-
tion to include, but also that the cross-terms between horsepower and ITQ could be
3 However, even this can be seen as a fixed factor of production since crew size on a vessel is fixed over
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excluded. The coefficient of the cross-term was not statistically significant in the
preliminary specifications of the model. Intuitively and based on observation, the
lack of interaction between horsepower and ITQ makes a lot of sense—why bother
to invest in bigger, more powerful vessels when you no longer have to race to get as
many clams as you can in a short period of time?
The final specification of the production functions and the share functions are
the following simple linear models with cross-terms between ITQ and conventional
inputs:
LNCATCH = a0 + a1HP2 + a2NUMBER + a3YB2 + a4SUBST (16)
+ a5ITQ + a6TAC + a7NUMITQ + a8YBITQ + a9SUBSTITQ
LNSHARE = b0 + b1HP2 + b2NUMBER + b3YB2 + b4SUBST (17)
+ b5ITQ + b6TAC + b7NUMITQ + b8YBITQ + b9SUBSTITQ
where LNCATCH is the natural log of catch for an operator, LNSHARE is the natural
log of each operator’s share of total landings, HP2 is a measure of horsepower of the
vessels utilized by the operator, NUMBER is a measure of vessel operator’s fleet
size, YB2 is a measure of the age of an operator’s vessels and it proxies fishing tech-
nology, SUBST is a measure for the alternate product harvested, ITQ is a dummy
variable to capture the introduction of ITQs, TAC is the total allowable catch level
set for the fishery, and NUMITQ, YBITQ, and SUBSTITQ are interaction terms be-
tween ITQ and the other independent variables.
A positive relationship is hypothesized between horsepower and catch, and
horsepower and owner’s share. Operators with larger and more powerful vessels
should catch more and have greater owner’s shares due to economies of scale,
greater capacity, greater crew size, greater access to capital, and greater flexibility in
applying more effort to capital. That is, the marginal product of a bigger boat is ex-
pected to be positive in the relevant stage of production.
The hypothesized relationship between vessel age and catch is negative, as is
the anticipated relationship between vessel age and owner’s share. Older boats are
less versatile, cannot readily accommodate greater effort, are less appropriate as col-
lateral for capital and involve greater maintenance, repair, and down time. Newer
boats can be taken out to sea more frequently and are more conducive to the use of
new technologies.
The hypothesized relationship between both catch and share, and number of
vessels is positive. Typically, the more vessels an operator has, holding effort con-
stant, the greater the catch. Although initial quota share distribution was based on
vessel ownership prior to ITQ introduction, after the initial distribution, quota share
was not tied to vessel ownership. Nevertheless, economies of scale and management
advantages may accrue to large fleet operators.
The hypothesized relationship between catch and effort devoted to alternative
products is expected to be negative. The more effort devoted to harvesting ocean
quahogs for example, the less the effort and trips devoted to surf clams, and the less
the surf clam catch and share.
The hypothesized relationship between TAC and catch is positive. However, the
expected relationship to owner’s share is difficult to determine a priori. The extent
to which firm level catch declines can vary with type of operation.
In the presence of ITQs, it is hypothesized that the typical operator’s landings
would increase as benefits accrue to operators from the utilization of fewer, newer,
or larger boats. That is, ITQs should discourage the use of small, old, and inefficient
vessels, thereby reducing the total number of vessels and operators (V), increasing
the average catch of remaining operators (E) and increasing trips per vessel (F). TheITQs: Market Share, Efficiency, and Conservation 127
physical plant is therefore expected to be used at greater efficiency and capacity so
that the shares of remaining operators increase. Based on the above, one expects the
impact of ITQs on the marginal products of horsepower and of fleet size to be posi-
tive, and the impact on the marginal product of age to be negative. Finally, for a ves-
sel operator whose effort toward alternative products remains constant, ITQs can be ex-
pected to raise catch by raising vessel operating efficiency. Consequently, for remain-
ing operators, owner’s share and catch should rise with the introduction of ITQs.
All the data used in this study were made available by the National Marine Fish-
eries Service (NMFS), Northeast Fisheries Center. Logbook data were collected for
every trip made by each vessel. These logbook data provide the date of the fishing
trip, the vessel name and permit number, species of clam landed, number of bushels
landed, and vessel owner. Vessel characteristic data and information about the an-
nual TAC levels were provided by the NMFS upon request.
Each observation in the data represents a particular owner during a particular
year (see footnote 1). Data on all participants in the fishery are included in the
analysis from 1988 through 1994. Therefore the same owner may appear as an ob-
servation once for each of the seven years of data.
Horsepower is represented by the variable HP2 which is the percentage of ves-
sels owned by this particular owner that are 400 to 1,640 horsepower. The median
horsepower of vessels in the fishery was approximately 400. The data set includes
vessels that range from 115 to 1,640 horsepower. The expected coefficient of HP2 is
positive. NUMBER is measured simply as the total number of vessels owned in a
particular year by a particular vessel operator, and therefore is also a measure of size
of the operation. It is expected that the coefficient of NUMBER is positive.
Age of the vessel is proxied by YB2 which represents the percentage of “newer”
vessels owned by a particular fisherman in a particular year that were built in 1980
or later. Vessels in the data set were built anywhere from 1866 to 1991. By 1980, the
vessel moratorium on surf clam vessels had been in effect for three years. The only
way new vessels could be brought into the fishery during the moratorium was as a
replacement for a vessel that was no longer operable. Although new gear was al-
lowed to be incorporated on vessels in the fishery, the new vessels allowed into the
fishery were one of the few means by which vessel owners could introduce new
technologies to their operations. The expected coefficient of YB2 is positive.
The number of bushels of the alternate resource landed by the owner (SUBST) is
a proxy for effort devoted to alternative products. An increase in ocean quahogs
landed by the operator should reduce surf clam catch and owner’s share of total in-
dustry surf clam catch.
The dummy variable for ITQ equals 1 if the ITQ was in place for the entire
year; therefore, ITQ equals 1 for 1991 through 1994. ITQ equals 0 if the ITQ was
not in place for all or part of the year, and ITQ equals 0 for 1988 through 1990. The
cross-terms between the ITQ variable and other factors show how the introduction of
ITQs alter the marginal product of other inputs. These cross-terms are created by
multiplying the value of the ITQ dummy variable by the value of the independent
variables NUMBER, YB2, and SUBST to create the variables NUMITQ, YBITQ, and
SUBSTITQ. Finally, TAC was measured as the maximum bushels of each species al-
lowed to be harvested by the entire fishery.
Empirical Results
Parameter estimates of the production functions appear in table 3, and the estimates
of the share equations appear in table 4. In the tables, both Ordinary Least Squares
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signs as the OLS results, although far more coefficients were significant in the 2SLS
models. For example, for both the catch and share equations, the coefficient of the
independent ITQ variable became significant in the 2SLS regression for surf clam
while the coefficients of HP2, NUMBER, SUBST, and NUMITQ became significant
in the 2SLS regression for ocean quahogs. In the rest of the analysis, we will focus
on the 2SLS results since the coefficients are more efficient than the OLS results.
The results for the two fisheries are similar, but there are a few important differ-
ences. There were 302 observations. The R-square for the surf clam catch and share
regressions were 0.29 and 0.48, respectively. The R-square values for the ocean qua-
hog catch and share equations were 0.79 and 0.67, respectively. Considering the
short length of the time series, the limited information on costs, and the cross-sec-
tion nature of the data, the R-square values can be considered high. It is important to
note that because the parameter estimates represent changes in the natural log of
catch (or share) given a one unit change in the independent variable, the coefficients
are percentage changes in catch (or share).
The estimates of the share equations and their levels of significance differed
from those of the catch equations. Hence, δδ ln C ITQ T
r  and the impact of explana-
tory factors on total actual industry catch can be observed as the difference between
impacts on catch and share. In the surf clam fishery, six out of ten coefficients were
statistically significant at the 10% level for both the catch and share equations. In
Table 3
Estimated Impacts of Explanatory Variables on the Natural Log of Catch in the
Mid Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery Using OLS and 2SLS, 1988–94
Surf Clam Ocean Quahog
OLS Parameter 2SLS Parameter OLS Parameter 2SLS Parameter
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Name (Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept 10.58* 6.75* 9.86* –2.80
(1.06) (3.71) (0.77) (5.20)
HP2 0.002128 0.022867* 0.003328 0.125705*
(0.0013) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0064)
NUMBER 0.198162* 0.339072* 0.570696 1.991212*
(0.03) (0.11) (0.41) (0.27)
YB2 0.001971 0.00747807 0.020340* 0.047023*
(0.0030) (0.011) (0.0082) (0.013)
SUBST 0.000000728 –2.57617 E–6 –0.000000336 –0.00002408*
(0.00000051) (2.2 E–6) (0.0000022) (6.0 E–6)
ITQ –0.285177 –2.638576* 0.405956 0.362150
(0.20) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67)
NUMITQ 0.482861* 2.083156* –0.109941 0.649699*
(0.077) (0.27) (0.42) (0.37)
YBITQ –0.000236 0.00935525 –0.017680* –0.035061*
(0.0040) (0.01) (0.0092) (0.017)
SUBSTITQ –0.000002097* –0.00001012* –0.000002176 0.000010208
(0.00000067) (2.8 E–6) (0.0000027) (7.9 E–6)
TAC –0.000337 0.00042613 –1.019634 –0.00032009
(0.00033) (0.0012) (0.63) (0.00095)
R2: 0.44 R2: 0.30 R2: 0.33 R2: 0.79
* Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.ITQs: Market Share, Efficiency, and Conservation 129
the ocean quahog fishery, six out of ten were significant at the 10% level for the
catch equation, while seven out of ten were significant for the share equation. The
intercept, HP2, NUMBER, ITQ, NUMITQ, and SUBSTITQ were significant in the
share and catch equations for the surf clam fishery. The HP2, NUMBER, YB2,
SUBST, NUMITQ, and YBITQ were significant in the ocean quahog fishery for catch.
In contrast to the catch equation, for the ocean quahog share equations the intercept
and the ITQ variable became significant, while the YBITQ variable became insignifi-
cant. As will be seen later, these similarities and differences reflect not only the dif-
ferences in the fisheries before ITQ, but also suggest differences in the ways ITQ
introduction impacted production, productivity, and industrial organization.
Production and Industry Structures in the Pre-ITQ Regulatory Era
We first examine the coefficients of the production and share functions prior to the
ITQ regulatory regime. In the surf clam fishery, the hypotheses that the age of the
vessel is important to catch and owner’s share are rejected since the coefficients of
YB2 are not statistically significant in both equations. However, in the ocean quahog
fishery, the YB2 coefficient is statistically significant and positive for both the share
and catch equations, suggesting a positive marginal product of vessel newness and
Table 4
Estimated Impacts of Explanatory Variables on the Natural Log of Owner’s Share in
the Mid Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery Using OLS and 2SLS, 1988–94.
Surf Clam Ocean Quahog
OLS Parameter 2SLS Parameter OLS Parameter 2SLS Parameter
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Name (Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Intercept –4.66* –5.05* –5.55* –7.57*
(1.05) (1.07) (0.77) (1.4)
HP2 0.002324* 0.00405771* 0.003705 0.015517*
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0043) (0.0017)
NUMBER 0.197205* 0.214356* 0.574019 0.510649*
(0.030) (0.033) (0.41) (0.071)
YB2 0.001859 0.00320419 0.019888* 0.00997655*
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0081) (0.0036)
SUBST 0.000000723 3.071146 E–7 –0.000000345 –3.00554 E–6*
(0.00000051) (6.3 E–7) (0.0000022) (1.6 E–6)
ITQ –0.172576 –0.323123* 0.413965 0.329494*
(0.20) (0.19) (0.71) (0.18)
NUMITQ 0.472164* 0.615002* –0.112717 0.270865*
(0.077) (0.077) (0.42) (0.099)
YBITQ –0.000572 –0.00050678 –0.017250* –0.00689300
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0092) (0.0047)
SUBSTITQ –0.000002077* –2.91602 E–6* –0.000002153 1.082874 E–7
(0.00000066) 8.1 E–7 (0.0000027) (2.1 E–6)
TAC –0.000233 –0.00015115 –0.966268 0.00013632
(0.00033) (0.00033) (0.63) (0.00025)
R2: 0.44 R2: 0.48 R2: 0.33 R2: 0.67
* Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.Adelaja, McCay, and Menzo 130
greater market share for owners of newer vessels. That is, the younger the vessels,
the greater the catch and market share. The explanation for this is as follows. De-
spite the greater productivity of younger vessels in the ocean quahog fishery prior to
ITQ introduction, many old vessels remained in the fishery. On the other hand, in
the case of the surf clam fishery, where time restrictions on vessels existed, the ben-
efits of vessel newness were negligible.
The positive statistical significance of the HP2 coefficient in the catch and share
equations for both fisheries suggests that, consistent with expectations, using a more
powerful boat increases catch and market share. The larger impacts of HP2 on catch
and market share in the ocean quahog fishery compared to the surf clam fishery sug-
gest greater benefit of vessel power in the ocean quahog fishery. Similarly, the coef-
ficients of the NUMBER variable, which represent the marginal product of an addi-
tional vessel, are also statistically significant and positive for both fisheries. Results sug-
gest that by adding a vessel to one’s fleet, the vessel owner’s catch/share of landings in-
crease with greater percentage increases in catch and share in the ocean quahog fishery
than in the surf clam fishery. This is not surprising because there were many more
vessels in the surf clam fishery than in the ocean quahog fishery (133 in the surf
clam fishery and 62 in the ocean quahog fishery in 1988), and, therefore, the addi-
tion of one more vessel in the ocean quahog fishery should have a greater impact.
Substitutability between ocean quahogs and surf clams was hypothesized. The
hypothesis is rejected in the surf clam fishery in the pre-ITQ period, but not rejected
in the ocean quahog fishery for the pre-ITQ period. Both catch and market share are
adversely affected in the ocean quahog fishery when the catch of surf clam in-
creases. Hence, while increased resource commitment to ocean quahog fishing did
not affect surf clam fishing prior to ITQ introduction, increased resource commit-
ment to surf claming reduced ocean quahog fishing. Fishing time restrictions were
imposed on the surf clam fishery before ITQs were implemented. Hence, excess ca-
pacity existed to the point where ocean quahog catch could be increased without an
impact on surf clam catch. An operator was only allowed to fish for surf clams at
certain periods of time. Therefore, ocean quahog harvesting could be done when the
operator was not allowed to fish for surf clams. The finding of nonsubstitutability in
the surf clam fishery is evidence of inefficiency in the fishery prior to the introduc-
tion of ITQs. As will be seen below, the substitutability of ocean quahogs for surf
clams changes after the introduction of ITQs. Finally, the coefficients of the TAC
variable are not statistically significant in the catch and share equations for both surf
clam and ocean quahog, suggesting that marginal changes in TAC do not affect in-
dustry equilibrium.
Production and Industry Structure After the Introduction of ITQs
Before examining the ways by which ITQ introduction shifted the marginal products
and shares of conventional inputs, it is useful to examine first the independent
noninput-augmenting effects of ITQs. In the ocean quahog fishery catch equation,
the ITQ variable in and of itself is not statistically significant, suggesting that the
ITQ system did not independently affect catch and industrial organization in the in-
dustry. However, it appears that ITQ introduction did affect industrial organization
in that fishery by accentuating the effects of other explanatory variables. This hy-
pothesis is supported by the fact that some of the interaction terms (between ITQ
and other explanatory variables) are statistically significant. The implication of this
is that the way the ITQ system worked in the ocean quahog fishery is by encourag-
ing organizational changes that allow more efficient use of fisheries resources.
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suggesting that there is an independent negative ITQ effect. Note that the effect of
ITQ introduction on surf clam production exceeds the effect in ocean quahog pro-
duction. A possible reason for this is that many of the changes to the SCOQ fishery
in 1990 really were changes to the surf clam fishery. The surf clam fishery was more
restricted than the ocean quahog fishery prior to ITQ introduction; hence, ITQ intro-
duction brought about more significant changes to the surf clam fishery. The fact
that cross-terms were also significant in the surf clam fishery suggests the enhance-
ment of marginal products for conventional inputs.
We now examine the cross-terms between ITQ and the other independent vari-
ables. The positive estimated coefficients of the (NUMITQ) variable in the catch and
share equations for the surf clam fishery suggest that the marginal impact of an ad-
ditional vessel increased significantly after the introduction of ITQs. The marginal
percentage change in catch as a result of adding one boat was 0.34 prior to ITQ in-
troduction, but increased to 2.42 after ITQ introduction. The only ways that the mar-
ginal benefit of adding a boat can be greater after the introduction of ITQs than pre-
viously are if greater effort is applied per vessel and per trip and/or if more trips are
made per vessel after the introduction of ITQs. This is consistent with the fact that
much of the overcapacity that existed before ITQ implementation developed as a re-
sult of restrictions on fishing time and number of trips per vessel (Wang 1995). In
the ocean quahog fishery, the NUMITQ coefficient is also statistically significant
and positive, suggesting that ITQs also shifted the marginal product of NUMBER.
One way to explain the results, above, is the following. Before the ITQ system
was implemented, an additional vessel would allow a firm to increase surf clam
landings only to a certain point due to the fact that the vessel could not necessarily
be used at its full capacity due to the time and effort restrictions. These restrictions
encouraged operators to keep a large number of boats in the fishery. Although the
vessels were probably operating at full capacity while fishing, they were only al-
lowed to fish at certain times, and the fishery could catch no more than the allotted
quota. Because of the time restrictions, another way for a firm to obtain a greater
share of the annual industry quota was to replace incapacitated vessels with larger
vessels. After the implementation of the ITQ system, the number of vessels in the
fishery began to shrink rapidly due to the fact that time and effort restrictions were
removed. The results here suggest that greater effort and/or more frequent trips were
a major impact of ITQs.
In the surf clam fishery, increases are observable in hours fishing per vessel,
catch per trip, and number of trips per vessel (see table 2 and figures 1 and 2). These
increases were consistent with the decomposition depicted in equations (13) and
(14). The hours fished per vessel rose from 402 in 1988 to 1,400 in 1994. The surf
clam catch per trip rose from 992 in 1988 to 1,149 in 1994. The number of surf clam
trips per vessel rose from 23 in 1988 to 52 in 1994.
In the surf clam fishery, the interaction term between ITQ and the number of
ocean quahogs caught (SUBSTITQ) is statistically significant and negative in the
share and catch equations, suggesting that ocean quahogs were a substitute for surf
clams after the introduction of ITQs, while they were not before ITQ introduction.
For increased ocean quahog catch not to affect market share of surf clam prior to
ITQ introduction, but for it to decrease surf clam catch after ITQs were introduced,
it must be the case that capacity utilization was lower prior to the introduction of
ITQs. The results suggest that after the ITQ system was introduced, surf clam opera-
tors had to make output decisions as to which resource to harvest because ocean
quahogs started to become substitutes for surf clams. In the catch and share equa-
tions for the ocean quahog fishery, however, the SUBSTITQ parameter estimates are
not statistically significant. Hence ITQ introduction did not impact on the effect of
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The interaction of the age of vessel variable with the ITQ variable was not sta-
tistically significant in the surf clam fishery, suggesting that the efficiency level of
older vessels did not change after ITQ implementation. However, the YBITQ param-
eter estimate in the ocean quahog fishery is statistically significant and negative.
Implied Effects of ITQs on Resource Conservation
Recall that the CT
r  (total actual industry catch) is not necessarily equal to TAC (total
allowable catch) as it is conceivable that under a tradable quota situation, TAC is not
optimal. Hence, to the extent that ITQ introduction could expand the difference be-
tween  CT
r and TAC, ITQs could contribute to or detract from resource conservation
to the extent that conservation is enhanced by lowering catch levels below TAC.4
Given the differences in the coefficients of the share and catch equations, it is appar-
ent that δδ ln C ITQ T
r  is not zero and that ITQ introduction affected resource con-
servation. The possibility that the allowance of share tradability resulted in further
resource conservation beyond that achieved via the setting of TAC below the unregu-
lated equilibrium level has been ignored in previous studies on ITQs.
To evaluate the resource conservation implications of ITQ introduction, obtain
the following from equation (15): δδ ln C ITQ T
r  = δδ ln C ITQ i
r  – δδ ln S ITQ i
r .
The partial derivatives obtained from equations (16) and (17) suggest that
δδ ln ( ) ( ) ( ) C ITQ a a NUMBER a YB a SUBST i
r =+ + + 5 78 9 2 (18)
and
δδ ln ( ) ( ) ( ). S ITQ b b NUMBER b YB b SUBST i
r =+ + + 5 78 9 2 (19)
Hence, by substituting equations (18) and (19) into equation (15) one obtains
δδ ln C ITQ T
r = (a5 – b5) + (a7 – b7)(NUMBER) + (a8 – b8)(YB2) + (a9 – b9)(SUBST).(20)
By incorporating the statistically significant parameter estimates from the re-
gressions in equations (16) and (17), equation (20) becomes –2.32 + 1.47(NUMBER)
– 0.000007(SUBST) for the surf clam fishery and 0.33 + 0.38(NUMBER) –
0.035(YB2) for the ocean quahog fishery. Hence, the elasticities of total actual in-
dustry catch with respect to ITQ are –5.97 (statistically significant at the 0.10 level)
for the surf clam fishery and 0.294 (not statistically significant at the 0.10 level) for
the ocean quahog fishery.5 These results suggest that the introduction of tradable
4 Our use of the term “resource conservation” is two-fold. One follows the popular idea that lowering
catch, as measured by landings, lowers fishing mortality, and hence, increases the size of the spawning
stock. This presumes determinant relationships between spawning stock and future recruitment, a rela-
tionship not yet demonstrated for surf clams and ocean quahogs. In fact, TACs for these species have
been predicted on the idea that there is no such observable relationship, and thus TACs are based on a
mining strategy concerning rates of harvest of a nonrenewable resource. Accordingly, the second mean-
ing of resource conservation pertains to reducing the rate of extraction in order to make a limited and
possibly nonrenewable resource last longer. However, the most recent Stock Assessment Review Com-
mittee report of the Northeast Fisheries Science Center of NMFS suggests that signs of good recruitment
warrant moving toward a “sustainable yield” strategy (as excerpted in Mid Atlantic Fisheries Manage-
ment Council 1998; attachment 8).
5 Standard errors were calculated for  δδ ln C ITQ T
r  based on the component coefficients, and the means
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quotas contributed, albeit marginally, to resource conservation in the surf clam fish-
ery, but not in the ocean quahog fishery.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on ITQs by simultaneously investigating the
catch, capacity utilization, resource conservation and industrial organizational
changes, and the associated private and social efficiency gains that occurred in the
Mid Atlantic SCOQ fishery since the 1990 introduction of the ITQ system. The ap-
proach provides an unusual mechanism for simultaneously measuring changes in ca-
pacity utilization, changes in industrial organization, and changes in resource con-
servation. Results show that the ITQ system was factor augmenting in both the surf
clam and ocean quahog fisheries. In particular, the positive impacts of fleet size be-
came more pronounced since the introduction of ITQs. Thus, operational efficiency
is enhanced with ITQ introduction. Operational efficiency increases accrued because
vessels became more fully utilized and down time was reduced. Results also suggest
greater competition for resources between the ocean quahog and surf clam fisheries
after ITQ introduction. Overall, ITQ introduction also increased social efficiency by
resulting in further resource conservation over and beyond what was achieved by the
imposition of TAC.
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